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ABSTRACT 
 
I investigate whether timing of the elections impact globalization process or not in 
democratic countries across the globe. In other words, do elections slowdown 
globalization process? The theoretical underpinning is that, globalization process lead to 
economic and social hardships in short run but benefit the economy in the long run. The 
motto behind slowing down globalization process before elections is that it leads to 
polarization of voters and thus negatively affects the incumbent government. I make use 
of Axel Dreher’s comprehensive globalization index as proxy for overall globalization 
process; economic globalization index for economic globalization policies and 
restrictions index as proxy for removal of trade and financial restrictions. I then construct 
‘instrumental electoral cycle’ to capture the scheduled and midterm election cycle.  
 
Using cross-sectional time series data for 78 democratic countries for the period 1975 – 
2006, I find that scheduled elections are associated with slow down in all the three forms 
of globalization process, whereas midterm elections are not. Replacing all three Dreher’s 
indices with our modified indices does not alter the results. I also find that slow down in 
globalization process is responsive to the propinquity to a scheduled election year. 
Meaning, as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, globalization process 
keeps slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent 
government in office. These results suggest that elections generate “electoral 
globalization cycle” in democratic countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In electoral competition framework, there are different models which talk about the effect 
of elections on government behavior. The first such model, ‘political business cycle’ was 
formulated by Nordhuas (1975), Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte (1978). They argue that 
politicians manipulate the economic policies during the election period, by increasing the 
spending to boost economic growth on one hand and on the other hand, the incumbent 
government aims to keep the unemployment under control, leading to business cycles. 
While, Rogoff & Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) advocates ‘budget cycles’ by 
increasing the spending on consumption and reducing taxes before the elections to 
highlight that the incumbent is competent enough to deliver public services. Recently, 
Khemani (2004) developed the ‘career concern’ model in which she argues that pressure 
of elections will be higher on politicians to provide better public services and increase 
developmental spending and reducing non-developmental expenditure, highlighting that 
fiscal manipulation would be low and selective on some of the taxes and spendings which 
directly effect the people. All these studies deal with government policies with specific 
reference to fiscal policy. However, instead of looking at only fiscal policies, I probe the 
effect of general elections on globalization process in democratic economies. I undertake 
this investigation for two specific reasons: one, since the advent of neoliberal policies 
many economies saw structural changes which was resultant due to movement from 
‘inward looking polices’ towards ‘outward looking or liberalized policies’. These policies 
are driven by globalization process, which inturn affects basic government policies like 
fiscal and monetary policies. Therefore, one can assume globalization process as a 
derivative of government’s various economic policies. Two, the evidence on the effects 
of globalization process on socioeconomic conditions is mixed and hence its implications 
on elections are unknown.  Thus, this study bridges this gap and addresses several 
questions: Does incumbent government manipulate the globalization process and slow 
down its pace just before the elections to avoid the defeat? Whether there exists ‘electoral 
globalization cycle’? Do midterm elections affect globalization process? And what are 
the policy implications that we can derive from the results?  
 
In its most basic form, proponents of economic voting theory argues that voters who are 
most hurt by the government policies which lead to strained economic conditions are 
more likely to punish the incumbent governments in the elections (Burdekin, 1988; 
Lewis-Beck, 1991; Gleisner, R. F, 1992; Çarko lu, 1997; Wilkin et al. 1997; Fielding, 
1998 & 2000; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Chappell & Veiga, 2000; Lewis-Beck & 
Stegmaier, 2000; Youde, 2005; Nordhaus, 2006; Akarca & Tansel, 2006a & b; Duch & 
Stevenson, 2006; Mitchell & Willett, 2006 and Veiga & Veiga, 2006). Usually, voters 
relay more on the macroeconomic conditions of the country while voting (Lewis-Beck, 
1988), though certain elections are found to be issue based elections. But in majority of 
the cases, it is the economic situation on the ground which matters the most and is the 
driving factor for the voters (Alvarez et al., 2000). These macroeconomic factors are 
inturn determined by the globalization process initiated by the incumbent governments. 
There is empirical evidence to show that neoliberal policies lead to short term economic 
and social hardships, but provide economic benefits in the long run (Wolf, 1999; Staehr, 
2003; Vadlamannati, 2008). Because the benefits of such process tend to be isolated, but   3
the costs associated with it are strenuous in short run, those sections of the society who 
are worst hit by these policies would like to replace the incumbent government with those 
who are more likely to adapt policies which do not hurt the people. This forces the 
incumbent government to slowdown the globalization process as and when they near the 
scheduled election year. This would be the only option available with the government as 
it cannot completely reverse these policies which were adopted say a decade ago as 
reversal of these policies would prove very costly for the country. Hence, globalization 
process would be accelerated once the incumbent government gets back to the office post 
elections, thus creating ‘electoral globalization cycles’. However, this is exactly opposite 
in the case of midterm elections. This is because the timing of midterm elections (which 
occur anytime after a previous election) is unanticipated and hence, it does not provide 
incumbent government the scope to manipulate and slowdown the globalization process.  
 
2. Election Cycles & Globalization Process: Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
The literature presents conflicting findings on the implications of overall globalization 
process on socioeconomic development. The liberal theorists argue that countries which 
are highly engaged in globalization process are likely to experience higher economic 
growth, greater affluence, more democracy, and increasingly peaceful conditions in the 
home country and elsewhere (Flanagan & Fogelman, 1971; Weede, 1995; Jacobsen, 
1996). It is believed that globalization process is most likely to improving quality of life. 
It help promote economic development, providing trade and investment opportunities 
creating much needed employment generation and reduce income inequality and poverty 
thereby leading to decline in social unrest and economic insecurity. Thus, countries with 
higher levels of globalization process should suffer lesser degree of socioeconomic 
problems and have greater development. Higher globalization process also serves in 
attaining development goals for developing economies. 
 
On the contrary, skeptics contend that higher levels of globalization process tend to 
generate greater economic and social inequalities. This leads to greater economic 
insecurity and social unrest in the society. Sometimes it also paves way for the risk of 
political instability and outbreak of riots, agitations, protests, conflicts and disturbances 
thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodrik, 1997, Rodrik, 1998; Rodriguez 
& Rodrik, 2000, Blinder, 2006; Summers, 2006; Krugman, 2007). 
 
Taking both these perspectives into consideration evolves another set of group which take 
middle path arguing that neoliberal policies brings both good and harm. Their premise is 
largely based on the J-Curve model developed by Przeworski (1993) who advocated that 
neoliberal policies though beneficial for the country and society in the long run, lead to 
economic and social hardships in the immediate short run. This theory argues that 
whatever might be the long-term implications of socioeconomic growth and high 
development, the immediate short term effect of globalization process is the structural 
adjustments in the economy which generates substantial economic and social costs in 
terms for increase in unemployment and inflation (Marer & Zecchini 1991), resource 
misallocation (Roland 1994), volatility in income distribution (Milanovic 1995), 
declining output (Kolodko 1999), and poor socioeconomic conditions (DeMelo, Denizer,   4
& Gelb 1996). With specific reference to transition economies, there are prominent 
studies like Wolf (1999) finds a significant J-curve relationship between neoliberal 
policies and economic growth and development. Similar such findings were apparent in 
the study related to economic reforms and its impact on government repression by 
Vadlamannati & Soysa (2008). With specific focus on India, Vadlamannati (2008) finds 
similar such J-curve relationship between economic reforms and globalization with 
poverty levels, suggesting that economic globalization and internal reforms are associated 
with economic and social hardships in the short run, but are beneficial in long run. 
 
To control these economic and social costs in short run, sometimes the government 
resorts to policies which can be detrimental to the sizeable sections of the society. For 
example, to curtail high inflationary pressures, on one hand, the government hikes tax 
rates and on the other hand it can also increase interest rates. Similarly, in the process of 
making the public sector efficient and improve the savings of public sector, government 
undertakes massive restructuring policies like privatization program which many times 
results in huge layoffs. To contain higher levels of fiscal deficits, the governments due to 
their coalition political compulsions resort is cutting the social sector development 
expenditure. Such hard policies intended for long-term benefits make a sizeable fraction 
of the population disaffected (Mygind 1999). Thus, the incumbent governments who 
implement these neoliberal policies face severe pressures from those groups and sections 
in the society which are widely affected by these neoliberal economic policies. This 
creates short-run losers from globalization process as the major opposers of government’s 
neoliberal economic policies. Their main argument is that they do not believe the idea of 
the government which promises future gains and in return expecting political support to 
carry forward the neoliberal economic policies. Further, they believe that government 
often fails to keep the commitment which is made to the people during the previous 
elections that they would continue with the such polices until it yields benefits to the 
society in the long run (Slantchev, 2005). Moreover, Rodrik (1994) argues that the 
consequences of globalization often involve the redistribution of income among different 
groups. If the efficiency gains from the neoliberal policies is not substantial and income 
is not redistributed properly, this leads to either evade or slowing down of the 
globalization process. Precisely this is the reason why whenever the new form of polices 
are designed and adopted, there are wide spread agitations to resist making substantial 
policy changes which inturn affect the vast sections of the population. This sometimes 
leads to angry mob protests, conflicts, strikes and lockouts and riots forcing the 
governments to roll back or reverse the policy decisions (Fields, 2003). This also means 
that governments that are vulnerable to the reactions of certain sections of the society, 
which constitute significant portion, are less likely to carry forward the globalization 
process at a rapid pace and might engage in piece meal globalization process. This is 
exactly echoed by the study of Dewatripont & Roland (1992) who points out that to avoid 
opposition to implement tougher policies, it is more feasible for the governments to 
implement neoliberal policies at slow pace in order to avoid a status quo situation or 
confront with a situation where reversal would be the only option. 
 
According to the electoral competition theories the opportunistic politicians resort to 
manipulate economic policies during election times for political gain. Thus, keeping the   5
country’s long term economic benefits on stake by manipulating the economic policies to 
reduce their short term political losses (avoiding loosing elections). Infact the ‘political 
business cycle’ theory is propounded by Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck (1976) and Tufte 
(1978) argue that usually the incumbent governments keep growth high and 
unemployment low just before elections. To gain from these manipulations, the 
incumbent governments bank on uninformed voters who can provide them short term 
benefits. This model finds support in many studies in literature specially related 
developing countries. Studying the case of eight Latin American countries, Ames (1987) 
finds evidence of increased public spending during election years. Schuknecht (1996) 
examines fiscal policies in a sample of 35 developing countries from 1970 to 1992. He 
finds that while there is no election effect on real output, there are election-related 
expansions and reductions of the fiscal deficit by almost 0.7% of GDP. In an another 
study by Schuknecht (1999) finds for developing countries, that governments resort to 
expansionary fiscal policies to improve their chances of re-election. Moyo (1999) finds 
evidence of electoral cycles in public savings for a sample which includes both developed 
and developing countries. The study by Shi & Svensson (2000) examines fiscal policy 
electoral cycles for both developed and developing countries. They find evidence of 
political business cycles in government consumption and the fiscal deficit in a Rogoff-
style model, with cycles of greater magnitude in developing countries. Testing the same, 
Block (2002) presents cross-country evidence of political business cycles for African 
countries. Using five monetary and fiscal instruments, his findings are consistent with the 
predictions of rational opportunistic political business cycle theory. In a regional study on 
India by Chaudhuri & Dasgupta (2005) finds that there is an increase in current 
expenditure and decline in developmental spending during the election years
1. 
Contradicting these arguments, Khemani (2004) developed new model of ‘career 
concerns’ in which she argues that during the election years, there is a significant 
improvement in public services and political manipulation of all kinds of polices do not 
find support. Only development spending (capital expenditure) tends to increase, while 
nondevelopment spending (current expenditure) reduces. Nevertheless, these models 
demonstrate the manipulation of incumbent governments to persuade voters just before 
the election period and thereby generate electoral cycles.   
 
Taking into account former discussion on socioeconomic implications of globalization 
process and later debate on electoral cycles, I believe that a government that is responsive 
to its voters is more likely to slowdown the globalization process as the government nears 
scheduled elections. But the same responsive government once takes over the office soon 
after the elections, is more likely to accelerate the globalization process. This brings us to 
our first two propositions: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Slowdown in globalization process is associated with scheduled 
election years. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Slowdown in globalization process is greater as incumbent 
government nears scheduled election year. 
                                                 
1 There are also studies which have found contradicting results. See: Golden Poterba (1980); Alesina & 
Roubini (1992); Besley & Case (1995); Reid (1998).   6
Figure 1: ‘Electoral Globalization Cycle’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the first two hypotheses, I assume that there is an ‘electoral globalization cycle’ 
which basically means slow down in globalization process is responsive to the 
propinquity to a scheduled election year. Meaning, as incumbent government nears the 
scheduled elections (election year being 0 in figure 1), globalization process keeps 
slowing down, while this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent 
government in office. 
 
Here it is very important to make a distinction between scheduled elections and midterm 
elections. The scheduled elections are those which are constituted by the Constitutions of 
respective countries and occur once in every four and/or three years. Whereas, midterm 
elections are those that occur one, two, three or four years after the previous election 
(either scheduled or midterm), that is, before the completion of the full term of the 
present elected government in office. Therefore, this distinction between the two 
becomes even more important to globalization policy choices because the timing of 
midterm elections is usually sudden and unanticipated. So it is not reasonable to expect 
incumbent governments to slowdown globalization process to influence election 
outcomes. This leads to our final proposition: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Slowdown in globalization process is NOT associated with 
midterm elections because of its unanticipated and uncertain timing. 
 
Each of these hypotheses is examined in the empirical analysis which would follow this 
section. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3 deals with research 
design with specific focus on measuring globalization process, creating instrumental 
electoral cycles for midterm elections and distance from scheduled election year, 
followed by data sources and identifying the empirical strategy to be employed. Section 4 
presents discussion on the results derived from our empirical analysis. Final section 
concludes the study and highlights the implications of these results.  
Globalization  
process  
Years from scheduled election date 
 
(Scheduled election year = 0) 
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3. Research Design 
 
3.1. Measuring Globalization: Why Dreher’s Index? 
 
In all the studies in literature, globalization is measured only partially with one or a few 
economic variables like the trade ratio, direct foreign investment, capital flows, tariff 
rates, trade restrictions, monopolization of exports, black market premiums and country 
specific globalization dummies etc. Such measures are generally known as openness of 
the economy. Subsequently more comprehensive measures of globalization were 
developed with the weighted average or principal components methods. The well known 
Sachs and Warner (1995) binary index of openness is based on the weighted averages of 
some economic variables. Others, while accepting economic variables are important to 
measure globalization, argued that globalization has also political and social dimensions. 
The well known Freedom House discrete index of political freedom is based on a few 
such variables from the political and social sectors. The Freedom House index and 
similar measures are often used, along with a few other crucial economic variables, as the 
conditioning variables.
2 In practice it is hard to maintain a distinction between openness 
which is proxied with mostly economic variables and globalization measured with 
variables from the economic, social and political sectors. This remains the major criticism 
of the early empirical works on globalization. Majority of them have used single 
dimension indicators like trade openness or both trade and investments (FDI in particular) 
as alternative measure, which is not justifiable.  
 
Also, I would like to justify as to why only Dreher’s globalization index is selected over 
others. Infact Dreher’s globalization index is not first such attempt to quantify 
globalization process. The well known Lockwood & Redoano (2005) discrete index of 
globalization from 1980 – 2004, is also based on such economic, political and social 
variables. Similarly, Kearney, Andersen & Herbertsson (2005) using trade, finance and 
other political variables have also developed such indices for 62 countries starting from 
2000, to determine the annual rakings of countries on the basis of the Kearney index. 
Using similar such variables, the Andersen and Herbertsson index is developed for 23 
OECD countries for the period 1979 to 2000. Though these indices are well constructed, I 
have questions mainly related to how economic globalization was measured.  
 
I do not take into consideration the indices mentioned above for various obvious reasons. 
First, Lockwood & Redoano (2005) globalization index covers only trade and other 
economic variables ignoring some of the most important facets of economic globalization 
like: quantifying tariffs, restrictions and quotas. Thus, their index without these important 
measures becomes just another simple proxy like trade openness. Second, with respect to 
Kearny index, as highlighted by Rao et al. (2008), their weighting scheme is somewhat 
                                                 
2 Using mainly economic variables are: Edwards (1998), Dollar & Kraay (2004). Crafts (2000), Bordo & 
Meissner (2006) & Rincon (2007) found that globalization positively affects growth.  Chanda (2001) used 
capital account openness as proxy for globalization to find that globalization does not help developing 
countries in growth. Alesina et al. (1994) find the opposite. Using FDI as proxy for globalization, Zhang 
(2001), Campos & Kinoshit (2002), Alfaro (2003), Sethi & Patnaik (2004), Chowdary & Mavrotas (2006), 
Hansen & Rand (2006) & Hay (2006) find that globalization has positive effects on growth.   8
arbitrary in that they do not adjust for the size of the country on the basis of its 
population. Third, it is not possible to use both Kearney, Andersen & Herbertsson (2005) 
and Lockwood & Redoano (2005) indices in time series regressions because of the 
absence of time series data. 
 
We select Dreher’s indices for the obvious reasons mentioned above. First, his 
comprehensive globalization index is used as proxy for overall globalization process 
because, it also captures political and social dimensions, which I believe are important 
and are missing in single or bi-dimensional variables. Second, regarding economic 
globalization policies, we make use of his economic globalization index and with 
respective to removal of trade and financial restrictions, which is an important component 
of globalization, we use his restrictions index. We select these indices simply because it 
overcomes all the three disadvantages highlighted earlier. The Dreher’s economic 
globalization index combines many economic indicators along with ‘trade and investment 
restrictions’ like: hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade (% 
current revenue) and capital account restrictions, which no other indices captures as 
comprehensively as it does. Of course, the economic indicators in this index includes 
‘actual flows’, which captures: income (% GDP); volume of trade (% GDP); FDI inflows 
and inflows stock (%GDP) and Portfolio investments (% GDP). Third and other 
advantage of Dreher’s index is methodological as it uses widely available technique of 
the principal components method and Dreher index is most suitable for time series study 
as it dates back to 1970.  
 
Thus, in the light of these observations, Dreher (2006) is a welcome contribution because 
his comprehensive measures of globalization will help to decrease many disagreements 
on the measurement issue. The Dreher index is formulated for 123 countries from 1970 to 
2005 and recently updated. His overall globalization index includes three sub indices 
from the Economic Globalization, Social Globalization and Political Globalization; see 
Section 2 in the study of Dreher (2006) for detailed discussion of this
3. 
 
3. 2. Alternative Measures of Globalization: ‘Modified’ Indices  
 
All the Dreher’s indices related to globalization process are measured on 0 – 100 scale, 0 
meaning no or low particular globalization process, while a score of 100 means full 
globalization. Sometimes, there can be problems while using this index as dependent 
variable. Since the these indices coefficients are bounded between 1 and 100, using 
Ordinary Least Squares regression might sometimes be problematic. This is because, 
often OLS assumes that the dependent variable to be unbounded. Thus, to counter this 
problem we follow Reuveny & Li (2003) method, which is a usual practice to transform 
the bounded variable into unbounded indicator. I transform all the three indices into 
unbounded measure by using the following formula: 
 
 
Unbounded Globalization Index =  
 
                                                 
3 These indices can be downloaded from http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
 Globalization Index 
 
100 – Globalization Index   9
 
 
Unbounded Economic Globalization Index = 
 
 
 
 
Unbounded Restrictions Index = 
 
 
I however, make use of these unbounded transformed indices to assess the robustness of 
the main results.  
 
3. 3. Constructing Instrumental Electoral Cycles 
 
The need for constructing instrumental electoral cycle arises from the question whether 
timing of elections are endogenous to neoliberal policies carried by the respective 
incumbent governments.  Theoretically speaking, this may not be true because in the 
scheduled elections are fixed for four to three year basis. However, over the period of 
time, especially post 1990s we witnessed quite a few midterm general elections. These 
occur due to various reasons which include drifting away the Members from ruling 
alliance, political instability because the governments sometimes do not possess the 
required numbers to prove its majority in the parliaments, shifting of political alignments 
within the alliance group and so on. Infact in our sample from 1975 to 2006, out of total 
605 general elections, 91 happens to be midterm elections and rests are scheduled 
elections. This means around 23% of the total general elections in our sample period are 
marked by midterm elections. The exact timing of these midterm elections is sudden and 
unanticipated. Since these events are unexpected, it might not lead to slow down in 
globalization process, as the incumbent government would not have ample time to plan 
and react to these midterm elections. One possible solution to address this problem is to 
distinguish between the effects of scheduled and midterm elections on the outcome of 
interest – all the three indices of globalization. To this end, I employ the technique of 
Khemani (2004) in constructing what is called as “instrumental electoral cycle” for both 
scheduled and midterm elections.  
 
Figure 1: Scheduled election cycle 
      
 
 
 
 
Years 
Note: SE= Scheduled Elections 
 
The typical scheduled election cycle is the one which follows a 4-year cycle and is 
renewed after every schedule election year, that is, it again begins with 4, 3, 2 and 1. The 
figure 1 best captures coding of this cycle. In some countries, the scheduled elections 
SE    4    3    2    1  SE   4    3    2    1  SE   4   3     2    1   SE 
Economic Globalization Index 
 
100 – Economic Globalization Index 
 
 
 Restrictions Index 
 
100 – Restrictions Index   10
occur once in four years. In such cases, the coding would begin from 3, 2 and 1. To 
capture the scheduled elections effect, we give the value of 1 for scheduled elections year 
and 0 otherwise. One may note that we do not give the same dummy coding to midterm 
elections because we capture its effect in separate cycle called ‘midterm electoral cycle’.  
 
Figure 2: Midterm election cycle 
      
 
 
 
 
Years 
Note: SE= Schedule Elections; MT= Midterm Elections 
The midterm election cycle also follows a 4-year cycle, but it is also renewed after every 
midterm election. Many times, the scheduled elections coincide with election years in 
midterm election cycle. The midterm election years are treated to be 4, 3, 2, 1 year before 
a scheduled election year. The year after any midterm election is again coded as 4 years 
before a scheduled election followed by 3, 2 and 1. The timeline of the midterm election 
cycle is captured in figure 2. Based on these discussions, we formulate the empirical 
model to estimate the direct effect of the electoral cycle on all three forms of 
globalization polices of the incumbent government: 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (1) 
 
Where: GLOP = globalization process proxied by overall globalization index, economic 
globalization index and restrictions index; i = country; t = time; α  = Intercept for the 
equation; Ω = regression coefficients for variable “n”; ζ = error term for country at time 
“t”. The hypothesis variables presented here are: SEC = Scheduled elections which is 
coded 1 for scheduled election years and 0 otherwise; MTC = Midterm election cycle 
and Ŧ = 1, 2, 3 & 4 for respective electoral cycles. This means for example: MTC
0
t is 1 if 
t is a scheduled election year in respective country; MTC
1
t is 1 if t is one year before a 
scheduled election year; MTC
2
t is 2 if t is two years before a scheduled election year; 
MTC
3
t is 3 if t is three years before a scheduled election year and MTC
4
t is 4 if t is three 
years before a scheduled election year in the respective country. The economies vary in 
size, political climate and the levels of socioeconomic developmental aspects are 
different. To capture these effects, we include control variables in the same equation: 
Control Variables (CVt). The description of these variables is given in the next section. 
This model allows to tests key hypotheses mentioned earlier: H1; H2 & H3.  
 
To capture the effects of distance from election years on all three forms of globalization, 
we developed ‘distance from election cycle year dummies’. We formulate “electoral 
cycle” which includes four dummy variables namely: 4-years before elections variables 
which take the value of 1 in the 4
th year before every schedule election year and 0 
SE    4    3  MT  4   3    2    1   SE  4   MT 4    3    2   1   SE    
                                         4                                      4 
GLOPit = α1 + Σ Ω2 SEC
Ŧ
it    + Σ Ω3 MTC
Ŧ
it    + Ω4 CVit  +  ζit 
                                                            
Ŧ=1                              Ŧ=1
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otherwise. The second dummy includes 3-years before elections variable which has the 
value 1 in the 3
rd year before every schedule election year and 0 otherwise. The third 
dummy variable is 2-years before elections variable include the value of 1 in the 2
nd year 
before every schedule election year and 0 otherwise. Finally, 1-year before elections 
variable takes the value of 1 in the 1
st year before every schedule election year and 0 
otherwise. These variables allow measuring how the temporal distance from a scheduled 
election year affects globalization process vis-à-vis an election year. The model is 
specified as follows: 
 
 
 
 
……………………………… (2) 
Where, D1, 2, 3, 4…are the distance from election year dummies. The empirical analysis 
covers 78 countries which included both developing and developed economies for the 
period 1975 to 2006. We estimate all models using year dummies to estimate any effects 
of trending data.  However, the pooled time-series cross-sectional (TCSC) data may 
exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation problems. While these problems do not 
bias the estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust 
method for large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. However, they 
often tend to cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical 
inferences. To deal with these problems, we estimated for all the models the Huber-White 
robust standard errors clustered over countries. These estimated standard errors are robust 
to both Heteroskedasticity and to a general type of serial correlation within the cross-
section unit (Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  
 
3. 4. Control Variables 
 
Here we also include analysis of important control variables which determine 
globalization process. To this end, we introduce set of independent variables namely, 
macroeconomic, political and institutional factors. Controlling for these factors, we test 
whether electoral cycles (scheduled and midterm) form important source of constraints 
on globalization process. 
 
3. 4. i. Macroeconomic Factors 
 
a. Economic Development 
 
Neoliberal policies are easier to implement in the countries which are wealthier (Manzetti 
1999). This is because high income countries provide the cushion to the governments to 
offset the social and economic costs associated with such policies. Thus, globalization 
can be enhanced in the higher income countries (Biglaiser & Danis 2002). To capture the 
effect on high income, I take into account percapita GDP. Thus, it is expected that high 
per capita GDP is positively related to overall globalization process. The data for 
percapita GDP are in US dollars 2000 constant and are logged and captured from World 
Development Indicators (2006). 
                             4                        4 
GLOPit = λ1 + Σ β2 SEC
Ŧ
it  + Σ β3 MTC
Ŧ
it  + β4 CVit + β5 D1it + β6 D2it  + β7 D3it + β8 D4it + υit 
                                    Ŧ=1                            Ŧ=1
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b. Economic Growth 
 
We also capture the effect on economic growth to proxy for relative size of the economy. 
Higher the economic growth, greater the chances to carry forward the globalization 
policies as high growth coupled with increase in percapita GDP should translate into 
better standard of living of the poor. To capture this effect, we include GDP growth rate 
as proxy for relative size of the economy. The data for GDP growth rate comes from the 
World Development Indicators (2006).  
 
3. 4. ii. Political & Institutional Factors 
 
d. Political Regime 
 
Effect of political regime on globalization process is the most contentious topic in 
political economy. Conventional wisdom posits that autocracies are better off to 
democratic setup in implementing neoliberal policies of their choice. Often the case 
studies of India and China are cited as apt examples. There are infact studies by Haggard 
& Kaufman (1995) and Weyland (1998) which show that globalization policies can be 
easily implemented in authoritarian rule as the state is often insensitive towards general 
public sentiments and opinions. Also, the authoritative regimes are not under constant 
pressure to seek the public opinion in the form of elections once in five years.  On the 
other hand, it is believed that the implementation of neoliberal policies is very slow in 
democratic regimes. This is because it has various compulsions like facing public anger 
against a policy decision; coalition compulsions; differences within the ruling party 
alliances and so on. But having said this, there are vast numbers of studies like: Giavazzi 
& Tabellini (2004); Leonida, Patti & Navarra (2005) which shows that neoliberal policies 
lead to democracy. However, the study by Gans-Morse & Nichter (2008) highlights that 
countries engaging in such policies may experience a temporary deterioration of 
democracy, but tends to become more democratic in the long run. Further, the studies of 
Przeworksi, et al. (2000); Biglaiser & Danis (2002); and Jakobsen & De Soysa, (2006) 
show that it is the democratic countries that better protect the property rights and are 
efficient in distributing the resources accordingly, thus giving scope for a positive 
association between democracy and globalization process.   
 
Due to the conflicting arguments in the literature and the fact that transition economies 
have just begun transiting from autocratic setup towards democracy, I make no 
assumptions on the relationship and direction between political regime and globalization 
process. To measure political regime, I include regime type data Polity IV constructed by 
Marshall & Jaggers (2002). We then follow Londregan & Poole (1996) by subtracting 
Polity IV’s autocracy score from its Democracy score, giving rise to the final democracy 
score that ranges from +10 to –10, wherein, +10 being the most democratic, +5 being 
partially democratic and -10 is fully autocratic.  
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e. Majority Margin of Ruling Government 
 
The globalization process is facilitated and strengthened when the ruling party 
government controls the legislature (Biglaiser & Brown, 2005 and Ross, 2006). In 
democratic setups it becomes extremely important for the government to hold majority in 
the parliament for speedy implementations of the policies. Failing to hold majority would 
lead to coilation politics wherein it becomes extremely difficult for the government to 
carry forward the globalization process at rapid pace. To measure this effect, I employ the 
Keffer (2007) Database of Political Institutions’ majority margin indicator in which the 
ruling governments’ seat share in Parliament is computed. In some occasions a score of 1 
is also given, which symbolizes that the government has full majority in the House or it is 
a single party state.  
 
f. Political Ideologies 
 
Ruling party government’s ideology also influences the neoliberal agenda. We have four 
sets of groups’ viz., the right wings; left wings; centrists and others. Historically, the left 
wing parties like Communist Party have strong trade and industrial union associations. 
They are usually pro-labour, pro-middle class; pro-state intervention; anti-industrialists 
and MNCs. They are also major opposers of globalization policies. Kingstone & Young 
(2005) argue that leftist have traditionally promoted more government intervention in the 
economy, in the form of state enterprises and the allocation of resources to labor, 
domestic business, and the middle class. The study by Katsoulakos & Likoyanni, 2002 
finds that across the world, neoliberal policies and more specifically privatization reforms 
programs unlike leftists are associated with right wing governments, who are pro-active 
towards such process. Thus, governments in power belonging to leftists’ ideologies are 
associated with halt in globalization process.   
 
To control for ruling party ideology preference, I include a measure of ruling party 
ideology that categorizes whether the ruling party government is a left or right or 
centrists. For this purpose I formulate three different variables namely, left wing dummy; 
right wing dummy and centrists dummy, which takes the vale as 1 if the ruling party fall 
under any of the category and 0 otherwise respectively. The data is obtained from Keffer 
(2007) Database of Political Institutions. I expect both right wing and centrists’ ideology 
based governments are associated with higher globalization.  
 
g. Conflicts 
 
Empirical studies have found significant negative impact of conflict on short term 
economic growth and development (Collier, 1998). Conflicts affect growth and 
development process in many ways. It leads to diversion of productive resources for 
unproductive purposes where the returns on such investments are nothing bit nil 
Grossman & Kim, 1996). In an already crippled state, conflicts increases the military 
spending which inturn crowds-out private and foreign investments creating huge negative 
fiscal impact and hamper the prospects of socioeconomic development (Deger & Sen, 
1983; Klein, 2004; Vadlamannati, 2008). Under these circumstances it would be difficult   14
to implement globalization policies at a rapid pace. This is because as already pointed out 
the neoliberal leads to short term losses but benefits are visible only in long run and if the 
equal redistribution of resources do not happen as highlighted by Rodrik (1994), this 
would worsen the situation. Thus, we expect a negative association between conflicts and 
globalization process. We introduced conflict variables as dummy coded 1 if there was 
conflict in the country in that year and 0 otherwise. The data for this variable is from 
2007 Uppsala updated dataset on conflicts.  
 
h. Time 
 
Since our sample includes both developing and developed countries, the globalization 
process varies significantly across the countries and time. To capture the variation of 
globalization process throughout the countries across 32-year period, I incorporate the 
measure of time variable. I believe that it is very important to control for time because 
from 1980s there is marked increase in globalization process specially with respect to 
developing economies. Thus, I expect an increasing trend in all three indices as the years 
progress. 
 
4. Empirical Results & Estimates 
 
4. 1. Descriptive Statistical Analysis 
 
The sample of country-years that we examine in total make up of 2495 observations for 
main globalization index. This number comes down to 2400 for economic globalization 
index due to non availability of this index for three countries in the list of 78. This further 
drops to 1952 observations for restrictions index as this index is not available for as many 
as 17 countries.  In Annexure 1, we present summary statistics for this sample for all the 
variables that we employ in the regression analysis. The mean value for final 
globalization index is 49.69 per-years with a very high standard deviation of around 
19.14%.  Regarding the economic globalization index, we can see that the median value 
is 51.73. But the variance is also fairly high, with a standard deviation of 7.53 and the 
same for restrictions index is 6.17 with mean of 52.41. In all these three indices, we find 
that standard deviation values are very high, suggesting that there is a very high country-
variations in globalization process. With respect to GDP growth rate we can find that the 
median growth rate is 3.51%.  Moreover, the variance in GDP growth rates is fairly high, 
with a standard deviation of 4.13% and growth rates ranging from -24.05% to 35.63%. 
With respect to percapita GDP, the mean value is log 7243.84% with a standard deviation 
of as high as 9008.05%, highlighting significant cross country variations.  
 
In Annexure 2 we present the aggregate information about the swing and the degree of 
swing in final globalization index; economic globalization index and restrictions index 
during scheduled election years. We classified the swing or change in all the three 
indices, which is net change in the index in scheduled election year to immediate 
previous year, under three categories. These include: decline; marginal increase; and 
greater increase. These categories are arrived by using simple bifurcation of swing 
numbers which states that when the change of index from current year (election year) to   15
previous year is negative and or zero, then it is classified as decline. Similarly, when the 
change in the index is in the range of 0.01 – 0.85, then it is called marginal increase 
phase and when the index range from 0.86 and above, it is termed as greater increase. 
Using this simple methodology, we find in annexure 2 that out of total 494 scheduled 
elections which took place during 1975 – 2006 in 78 democratic countries, 40% of the 
times there was marginal increase in final globalization index. This means in as many as 
199 scheduled election years, the overall globalization increased marginally between 0.01 
– 0.86. In 135 occasions, the final globalization index registered decline, which is 27%. 
Remaining times, 160 scheduled elections saw globalization registering a higher increase. 
If we combine both decline and marginal increase election years, this comes to 334. This 
also means that out of total scheduled elections in all these countries during our study 
period, only 33% the scheduled elections did not have any impact on overall 
globalization index. On the contrary, with respect to economic globalization index, we 
find that there was greater increase in 206 election years compared to 129 and 140 
election years for marginal increase and decline respectively. But combining both 
marginal increase and decline shows that only 40% of the times, the scheduled elections 
did not have any impact on economic globalization process. We also examined the 
emergence of this phenomenon. We found that more than 80% of these 206 elections 
come from developed countries. This means that in developing countries, the economic 
globalization is still perceived as a sensitive issue during the elections period.  Finally, 
with respect to restrictions index, we find completely different results. Irrespective of 
whether it is developed or developing country, this strikes the chord with the voters. We 
find that around 41% of total scheduled elections, which is 160 elections out of total 387 
elections, there was decline in restrictions index. Decline in restrictions index means roll 
back of economic, trade and financial restrictions. In as many as 30% of the total 
elections, which is 116 times, there was only marginal increase in the index. In the 
remaining 111 elections, which means only 27% there was a greater increase in the index. 
This gives us that fist glimpse that there is certainly great impact of scheduled elections 
on the slowing down of globalization process in election years especially in the late over 
all globalization process and removal of restrictions. But it is not as comprehensive as we 
as we would have expected in the case of economic globalization process. 
 
4. 2. Regression Estimates 
 
The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of scheduled, midterm 
elections and electoral cycle on globalization process is presented in table 1. We present 
models total nine models in which first three models (1 to 3) are related to globalization 
index, followed by another three models (4 to 6) are related to economic globalization 
index. The final three models (7 to 9) capture the Restrictions index. Addressing the 
problems of stability of these results, sensitivity analysis is conducted by replacing these 
three indices with our modified indices and the results are displayed in annexures. 
Similarly, other robustness check results are also displayed in annexures. We also control 
for the problem of Heteroskedasticity using White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors & covariance.  
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The regression results confirm the hypothesis offered on electoral cycles in globalization 
process. Specifically, the results from models 1 to 3 show that scheduled elections have a 
significant negative effect on the overall globalization process. Concentrating on results 
of equation 1 indicates the direct relationship between globalization process and electoral 
cycle. The coefficients reported in model 1 (table 1) indicate that the scheduled elections 
is leading to decline in overall globalization index by 1.65% with 1% statistical 
significance. In model 2 we include midterm election cycle. Though the results show 
negative sign, the results remain statistically insignificant. This suggests that midterm 
elections do not have any impact on slowing down of overall globalization process 
because of the uncertainty of occurrence associated with such elections. 
 
We present the electoral cycle using distance from election year dummies in model 3 (see 
table 1). The results show some interesting findings. We find that the variables, 3, 2, and 
1 year distance from election year is positive. But the coefficient values of these variables 
show some interesting trends. I find that overall globalization process would still be 
negative -0.52% during the first year of incumbent government in office. This increase is 
positive 0.36% during the second year of incumbent government in office. While, 
economic globalization process decrease slightly with 0.34% in the third year of 
incumbent government in office, it decreases drastically to 0.22% in the fourth year in 
office, registering an insignificant decline in overall globalization index by 0.12% in the 
year before a scheduled election. This goes down even further in the election year 
resulting in negative effect on overall globalization process. The coefficients plotted in 
graph 1 (see annexures) clearly depict a ‘cyclical movement’ in carrying out the 
comprehensive globalization process by the incumbent governments. The graph shows a 
perfect inverted U-shaped relationship between scheduled elections, electoral cycle and 
overall globalization process. We also estimated this equation by including scheduled 
election variable with these full electoral cycle dummies in the same model (model not 
shown, but provided on request). We again found similar such relationship between 
scheduled elections, electoral cycle and overall globalization process. The coefficients of 
this model are also captured inverted U-shaped relationship. These results confirm all the 
three hypothesis, H1; H2 & H3 with respect to overall globalization process. 
 
Table 1: Election cycle & Globalization; Economic Globalization; Restrictions equation 
 
Variables Model  1 
 
(GLO) 
Model 2 
 
(GLO) 
Model 3 
 
(GLO) 
Model 4 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 5 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 6 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 7 
 
(REST) 
Model 8 
 
(REST) 
Model 9 
 
(REST) 
 
 
Constant 
-39.99 * 
(1.28) 
-40.16 * 
(1.32) 
-40.26 * 
(1.31) 
-35.86 * 
(1.94) 
-36.08 * 
(1.98) 
-36.29 * 
(1.96) 
-58.85 * 
(2.12) 
-58.17 * 
(2.18) 
-58.28 * 
(2.16) 
Scheduled Election year 
-1.65 * 
(0.38) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.95 ** 
(0.47) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-2.47 * 
(0.58) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Mid-term Election year 
------ 
 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.04 
(0.21) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.46 * 
(0.25) 
------ 
 
1 year before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.22 
(0.49) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.60 
(0.65) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.71 
(0.78) 
2 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.34 
(0.49) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.59 
(0.66) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.76 
(0.78)   17
3 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.36 
(0.51) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.57 
(0.70) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-1.06 
(0.81) 
4 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.52 
(0.66) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.08 
(0.89) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-1.64 + 
(1.09) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.004 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.25 * 
(0.06) 
0.25 * 
(0.06) 
0.25 * 
(0.06) 
0.18 * 
(0.07) 
0.17 ** 
(0.07) 
0.17 ** 
(0.07) 
Log  
(Economic Development) 
9.98 * 
(0.15) 
9.97 * 
(0.15) 
9.96 * 
(0.15) 
9.41 * 
(0.22) 
9.41 * 
(0.22) 
9.41 * 
(0.22) 
12.36 * 
(0.25) 
12.30 * 
(0.25) 
12.31 * 
(0.25) 
Democracy  
0.21 * 
(0.03) 
0.20 * 
(0.03) 
0.20 * 
(0.03) 
0.25 * 
(0.05) 
0.24 * 
(0.05) 
0.24 * 
(0.05) 
0.27 * 
(0.05) 
0.26 * 
(0.05) 
0.25 * 
(0.05) 
Right Wing Parties  
in Power 
-3.08 * 
(0.49) 
-3.08 * 
(0.49) 
-3.10 * 
(0.49) 
-2.46 * 
(0.69) 
-2.46 * 
(0.70) 
-2.47 * 
(0.70) 
-0.54 * 
(0.74) 
-0.55 
(0.74) 
-0.52 
(0.75) 
Leftists Parties in Power 
-1.33 ** 
(0.58) 
-1.22 ** 
(0.59) 
-1.22 ** 
(0.59) 
-1.60 *** 
(0.99) 
-1.54 *** 
(0.99) 
-1.51 *** 
(0.99) 
-0.12 * 
(1.29) 
0.23 
(1.31) 
0.001 
(1.30) 
Centrists Parties in Power 
1.38 * 
(0.44) 
1.43 * 
(0.44) 
1.42 * 
(0.44) 
-1.99 * 
(0.63) 
-1.96 * 
(0.63) 
-1.98 * 
(0.63) 
0.54 * 
(0.74) 
0.64 
(0.74) 
0.62 
(0.74) 
Majority of Ruling 
 Government 
0.92 *** 
(0.59) 
0.85 + 
(0.61) 
0.82 + 
(0.60) 
4.05 * 
(0.91) 
3.98 * 
(0.92) 
3.92 * 
(0.92) 
3.64 * 
(1.08) 
3.81 * 
(1.09) 
3.71 * 
(1.08) 
Civil War 
-2.42 * 
(0.41) 
-2.34 * 
(0.41) 
-2.34 * 
(0.41) 
-4.65 * 
(0.55) 
-4.61 * 
(0.55) 
-4.59 * 
(0.55) 
-2.02 * 
(0.67) 
-1.88 * 
(0.67) 
-1.95 * 
(0.67) 
Time Dummy 
0.62 * 
(0.02) 
0.62 * 
(0.02) 
0.62 * 
(0.02) 
0.67 * 
(0.03) 
0.67 * 
(0.03) 
0.67 * 
(0.03) 
0.57 * 
(0.03) 
0.57 * 
(0.03) 
0.57 * 
(0.03) 
 
R-squared  0.801736 0.800121 0.800282  0.689625  0.689153  0.689343  0.731964 0.729828 0.729828 
Adjusted R-squared  0.800938 0.799316 0.799235  0.688326  0.687851  0.687650  0.730582 0.728435 0.728015 
S.E. of regression  8.539563 8.574279 8.576004  11.39988  11.40855 11.41223  12.14641  12.19471  12.20413 
F-statistic    994.3512     529.4239    529.7829  524.0606  402.5015 
Number of Countries  78  78  78 75  75 75  61  61  61 
Total  No. of Observations  2495 2495 2495  2400  2400  2400  1952 1952 1952 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. Models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis; GLO = Globalization 
Index; EGLO = Economic Globalization Index; REST = Restrictions Index; Sample period: 1975 – 2006. 
 
The relationship between economic globalization process and electoral cycle also tells the 
similar story. In model 4 (see table 1), we find that every single scheduled election year is 
associated with 0.95% decline in economic globalization process. This relationship is 
statistically significant at 5% confidence level. Proving again that midterm elections do 
not have any impact on slowing down of economic globalization process because of the 
uncertainty of occurrence associated with such elections, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant (see model 5; table 1).  
 
Model 6 presents the results of electoral cycle and economic globalization process. We 
find that all the variables, 4, 3, 2, and 1 year distance from election year is positive. I find 
that economic globalization process is positive with a small impact of 0.08% in the first 
year of incumbent government in office. During the second year of incumbent 
government in office, the positive impact jumps by 56.02%.This increases slightly to 
0.59% during the third year of incumbent in office. In the fourth year of incumbent in   18
office, the index further increases by 0.60%, before becoming significantly negative in 
the actual scheduled election year. These results highlight some interesting trend. We find 
that increase in economic globalization will be faster during the first two years of the 
incumbent government in office. This is precisely the reason why the negative effect of 
scheduled elections on economic globalization turns positive in the immediate first year 
of the incumbent government in office. Its increase is more than 0.50% in the second year 
in the office. But then on, in third and fourth years of the incumbent government in 
office, though we notice an increasing positive effect, the hike is only marginal, by 0.1% 
and 0.2% respectively. The coefficients plotted in graph 2 (see annexures) also depict a 
‘cyclical movement’ in carrying out the economic globalization process by the incumbent 
governments. This graph also shows a perfect inverted U-shaped relationship between 
scheduled elections, electoral cycle and economic globalization process. Like earlier, we 
also estimated this equation by including scheduled election variable with these full 
electoral cycle dummies in the same model (model not shown, but provided on request). 
We again found inverted U-shaped relationship between the two. These results prove all 
three hypotheses mentioned earlier with respect to economic globalization process. 
 
The results with respect to restrictions index are slightly different. Unlike our previous 
results, here we find in models 7 and 8, that both scheduled and midterm elections having 
negative impact on economic and financial restrictions. But it is the scheduled elections 
which is doing most of the damage. This is because the politicians have very less control 
over these policy issues during the midterm election years because of its uncertain 
timings. Every single scheduled election year is associated with 2.47% decline in 
restrictions index. One many note that increase in restriction index means reducing the 
economic and financial restrictions. Thus, a negative sign implies that the index of 
removal of restrictions of various kinds is reverting back. While every midterm elections 
lead to 0.46% decline in restrictions index. Both the variables are statistically significant 
at 1% confidence level.   
 
Model 9 presents the results of electoral cycle and restrictions index. Here, we find that 
all the variables, 4, 3, 2, and 1 year distance from election year is surprisingly negative. I 
find that restrictions index is negative with a large impact of -1.64% in the first year of 
incumbent government in office. During the second year of incumbent government in 
office, the negative impact however comes down to -1.06%. This value further comes 
down to -0.76% in the third year of incumbent government in office. In the penultimate 
year from scheduled elections, the impact on restrictions index drops to -0.71% before 
rising to -2.47% in the scheduled election year. In this model too, we find some 
interesting trends. We find that though in all years the restrictions index is negative 
because of its sensitive nature, which is well understandable, the negative effect keeps 
decreasing each year passes. The highest decline comes in the first of incumbent 
government in office with 0.83%, followed by 0.70% in third year and 0.58% in second 
year. The decline in index in the fourth year is just marginal, 0.5%. This also shows that 
the impact of electoral cycle on restrictions index is heading towards positive value as 
years pass by. The coefficients plotted in graph 3 (see annexures) though depicts ‘cyclical 
movement’ in removal of economic and financial restrictions by the incumbent 
governments, do not necessarily show inverted U-shaped curve. Rather, it depicts   19
inverted N-shaped kind of curve. We then estimated the same equation by including 
scheduled election variable with these full electoral cycle dummies in the same model 
(model not shown, but provided on request). We again found similar inverted N-shaped 
relationship between the two.  
 
Within the control variables, we find increase in GDP growth rate has a greater positive 
influence on both economic globalization and restrictions index. Holding at its mean 
value, increase in GDP growth rate by its highest value (34.65%) would increase 
economic globalization process and removal of restrictions by 0.25% and 0.17% 
respectively. Strangely, we find insignificant opposite results of the same with respect to 
overall globalization index. With respect to economic development, we see a consistent 
results displaying across the board. This apart, in all the models this variable is significant 
at 1% confidence level. This highlights the importance of economic development in 
influencing globalization process as a whole. The other significant finding of the study is 
that increase in democracy leads to significant positive impact on all the three indices. 
These results are consistent with the literature which suggests that democratization led to 
market opening up of the economy which, in turn, improves growth (Fidrmuc, 2003 and). 
These results are also consistent throughout all the models with 1% significance.  
 
Amongst other political factors, ruling party majority in parliament is strongly associated 
with increase in all three forms of indices. This suggests that obtaining the majority in the 
parliament by the ruling government can strengthen the globalization process as it would 
be free from coalition compulsions. The other interesting finding is that only centrists’ 
political ideologies are found to be associated with increase in globalization and 
restrictions index. While both rights and left wing political ideologies are negatively 
associated with all three forms of indices. These results are consistent across the board.  
We also find significant negative impact of civil war and internal conflicts on all three 
indices. Again these results remain significant at 1% confidence level in all the models. 
Lastly, there is a 1% significant positive effect of time variable in all the three models, 
suggesting that as the globalization process increases as time progresses.   
 
4. 3. Robustness Check 
 
We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we simply ran the results again by dividing the 
entire sample into half. We could not find real major changes in the results for all the 
three forms of indices. Second, we also ran all the results again by dividing the total 
sample group into two sets. One set includes developing countries and second set 
includes only developed countries. Again our results do not find any significant changes 
for all the three indices for both groups. This highlight the phenomenon of electoral 
globalization cycle is well evident irrespective of whether the countries are developing or 
developed
4.   
 
The third such robustness check test was performed based on the premise that there could 
be reverse feedback running from socioeconomic performance towards globalization 
process. This might give rise to endogenity concerns. To control for reverse causality, we 
                                                 
4 Both the results are not shown here due to space constraints. They will be provided upon request   20
ran all the models using Two Stage Least Squares method (TSLS). We make use of 
lagged values for key macroeconomic variables which we thought would have reverse 
causal effect like: GDP growth rate, percapita GDP and democracy levels as instruments 
for these variables. The results are displayed in annexure 3. We could not find any major 
significant changes in the results. Infact even the coefficient values also remained almost 
the same or have just marginally increased. Even in all the three cases related to electoral 
cycle, we could find inverted U-shaped relationship for the coefficients.  
 
Fourth and the final robustness check include performing sensitivity analysis, this time by 
changing the dependent variable. As said earlier, we included proxies for all the three 
indices. The modified indices were used as dependent variables instead of our original 
indices. We ran all the models without any change with these modified indices as 
dependent variables. The results are captured in annexure 4. We find that despite the 
change in dependent variable, the scheduled election cycle has significant negative effect 
on all the three modified indices (see models 19, 22 & 25 in annexure 4). But for 
modified restrictions index, the scheduled elections though negative, is insignificant. 
While, consistent with our earlier findings, we could not find any statistical significant 
impact of midterm elections on all forms of modified indices (see models 20, 23 & 26). It 
is also worth noting in models 21, 24 & 27 (see annexure 5) that distance from elections 
cycle variables depict the trend of perfect inverted U-shaped relationship with all the 
three modified indices. Despite performing several robustness checks, we could gather 
three important findings. These include: one, scheduled elections cycle significantly 
slows down overall globalization process, economic globalization and removal of 
economic and financial restrictions. Two, there is no impact of what so ever of midterm 
elections cycle on all the three variables and finally, there is a clear inverted U-shaped 
relationship between distance from elections cycle and all the three indices, suggesting 
that as incumbent government nears the scheduled elections, overall globalization 
process, economic globalization and removal of restrictions keeps slowing down, while 
this is exactly opposite during the early years of incumbent government in office. 
 
5. Conclusion & Summary 
 
Literature on political competition demonstrates how incumbent politicians might 
manipulate economic policies to persuade voters before an election, and thereby generate 
political budget cycles (Nordhuas, 1975; Lindbeck, 1976; Tufte, 1978; Rogoff & Sibert, 
1988; Rogoff, 1990; Khemani 2004). Several studies followed thereafter based on these 
models but are mostly restricted to monetary and fiscal policies. We extend this political 
business cycles model to globalization process for 78 developing and developed 
economies for the period 1975 - 2006. We make use of Axel Dreher’s comprehensive 
measure of globalization index as a proxy for overall globalization process along with 
economic globalization index and restrictions index. We then formulate ‘electoral 
globalization cycle’ based on the premise that globalization process leads to short run 
losses but benefit the economy in long run. Because the benefits of the neoliberal policies 
tends to be isolated and costs associated with it are strenuous and concentrated in short 
run, those sections of the society who are worst hit by these policies would like to replace 
the incumbent government with those who are more likely to adapt policies which do not 
hurt the people. This often forces the incumbent government to either maintain status quo   21
or drastically slowdown the globalization process as and when they near the scheduled 
election period. Based on this theory, we offered and tested three related hypotheses on 
electoral cycle related to overall globalization, economic globalization and economic & 
financial restrictions.  
 
Using cross-sectional time series DPI 2007 data on elections and Dreher’s overall 
globalization index; economic globalization index and restrictions index, we demonstrate 
that overall globalization process responds to the timing of general elections. We find 
identical results with respect to economic globalization and restrictions. While there is a 
strong electoral cycle in globalization process, which experiences a marked decline in 
election years, the impact of midterm elections is found to be insignificant on all the 
three. This is perhaps due to its timing which is uncertain and unanticipated which gives 
no scope of the incumbent governments to slow down the overall globalization process. 
The results portrayed in the paper are strongly valid as we have nullified the problems of 
stability and endogenity concerns. We also addressed the issue of how sensitive the 
results are.  To this end, we also addressed the issue of bounded dependent variables and 
converted the same into unbound variables. The results do not change using this 
unbounded globalization index; economic globalization index and restrictions index. 
Thus, an incumbent’s varying degree of concern for slowing down the globalization 
process for its short term political gains and fear against loosing the elections increases as 
the national elections draw nearer - does seem to be a plausible hypothesis across all the 
countries, and is well supported by the results in this paper. This is best exemplified by 
the estimated instrumental electoral cycle for all the three globalization indices wherein 
all the three indices tend to increase during the earlier years of an incumbent’s tenure in 
office, and decline as the scheduled elections draws near. Further, the statistically 
insignificant effect of midterm elections on all the three forms of indices also provides 
evidence in favor of the hypotheses offered in this study. 
 
Implications of the results  
 
The results in this paper highlight three important points. First, these results show that 
electoral cycles are not necessarily confined to fiscal and monetary policies alone. Rather, 
it can not only affect the most important policies like overall globalization process, 
economic globalization and economic and removal financial restrictions, which inturn 
drives various economic policies of the governments (like fiscal, monetary, public sector 
etc). Second, these results also suggest that elections can indeed act as a disciplining 
device for incumbent governments in the hands of the losers in the short run to influence 
the fate of the incumbent governments to halt the neoliberal policies. Finally, the effect of 
political manipulation of globalization process by the incumbent governments shows how 
politicians are only concerned to maximize their short run political gains at the expense 
of minimizing the country’s long run socioeconomic benefits generated from higher 
levels of globalization process. Taking these results into consideration, the next 
interesting step could be to probe whether similar such results can be replicated using 
time series cross-sectional analysis at regional level. Meaning, does neo liberal policies 
effect the regional elections? If so, is there “electoral globalization cycle” at regional   22
level?  These are some of the questions which give rise to further research avenues on 
this subject.  
 
Annexures 
 
Annexure 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
 Mean 
 
 
Median
 
 
Maximum
 
 
Minimum
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 Total 
Observations
 
 Total 
Countries
 
Globalization Index  49.69  46.11  93.65  9.57  19.14  2495 
 
78 
Economic Globalization Index  52.19  51.73  96.94  7.53  20.42  2400 
 
75 
Restrictions Index  52.41  50.77  97.14  6.17  23.4  1952 
 
61 
Modified Globalization Index  1.6  0.86  14.75  0.11  1.92  2495 
 
78 
Modified Economic Globalization 
Index  1.98 1.07  31.68  0.08  2.92  2400  75 
Modified Restrictions Index  1.6  0.97  15.2  0.03  1.99  1952 
 
61 
Scheduled Elections  0.2  0  1  0  0.4  2495 
 
78 
Midterm Election Cycle  2.003  2  6  0  1.12  2495 
 
78 
1-yr before scheduled election year  0.19  0  1  0  0.39  2495 
 
78 
2-yr before scheduled election year  0.18  0  1  0  0.39  2495 
 
78 
3-yr before scheduled election year  0.17  0  1  0  0.37  2495 
 
78 
4-yr before scheduled election year  0.09  0  1  0  0.28  2495 
 
78 
GDP growth rate  3.33  3.51  35.63  -24.05  4.13  2495 
 
78 
Log (Percapita GDP)  7243.84  2591.47  41445.94  124  9008.05  2495 
 
78 
Democracy 4.02  8  10  -10  6.91  2495 
 
78 
Right Wing  0.32  0  3  0  0.47  2495 
 
78 
Left Wing  0.07  0  1  0  0.25  2495 
 
78 
Centrists 0.32  0  1  0  0.47  2495 
 
78 
Majority Margin of ruling party  0.63  0.59  1  0  0.26  2495 
 
78   23
Civil War  0.17  0  1  0  0.38  2495 
 
78 
 
 
 
Annexure 2: Globalization process during Scheduled election years 
 
 
 Status of Globalization Index  No. of Scheduled Elections % Share Jump in Index 
 
 
Higher Increase in Index 
 
160 
 
33% 
 
> 0.86 & above 
 
Marginal Increase in Index 
 
199 
 
40% 
 
0.10 – 0.85 
 
Decline in Index 
 
135 
 
27% 
 
< 0.00 & Negative
 
Total Scheduled Elections 
 
494 
 
100% 
 
Status of Economic  
Globalization Index 
No. of Scheduled Elections % Share Jump in Index 
 
Higher Increase in Index 
 
206 
 
43% 
 
> 0.86 & above 
 
Marginal Increase in Index 
 
129 
 
27% 
 
0.10 – 0.85 
 
Decline in Index 
 
140 
 
30% 
 
< 0.00 & Negative
 
Total Scheduled Elections 
 
475 
 
100% 
Status of Restrictions Index  No. of Scheduled Elections % Share Jump in Index 
 
 
Higher Increase in Index 
 
111 
 
29% 
 
> 0.86 & above 
 
Marginal Increase in Index 
 
116 
 
30% 
 
0.10 – 0.85 
 
Decline in Index 
 
160 
 
41% 
 
< 0.00 & Negative
 
Total Scheduled Elections 
 
387 
 
100% 
Note: Decline = change in index is either 0.00 or negative in t from t-1; Marginal increase = change in 
index range between 0.10 – 0.85; Higher increase = change in index range from 0.86 and above. t = current 
year 
 
 
 
 
   24
 
 
 
Annexure 3: Two Stage Least Square Analysis – Election cycle & Globalization; 
Economic Globalization; Restrictions equation function 
 
 
Variables Model  10 
 
(GLO) 
Model 11 
 
(GLO) 
Model 12 
 
(GLO) 
Model 13 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 14 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 15 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 16 
 
(REST) 
Model 17 
 
(REST) 
Model 18 
 
(REST) 
 
Constant  -39.62 * 
(1.49) 
-39.64 * 
(1.52) 
-39.77 * 
(1.51) 
-37.72 * 
(2.21) 
-37.75 * 
(2.24) 
-38.06 * 
(2.21) 
-60.38 * 
(2.39) 
-59.21 * 
(2.40) 
-59.26 * 
(2.37) 
Scheduled Election year 
-1.68 * 
(0.38) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.98 ** 
(0.49) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-2.58 * 
(0.59) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Mid-term Election year 
------ 
 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.02  
(0.21) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.50 ** 
(0.25) 
------ 
 
1 year before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.24 
(0.49) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.53 
(0.66) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.74 
(0.78) 
2 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.40 
(0.50) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.51 
(0.68) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.91 
(0.80) 
3 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.40 
(0.52) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.61 
(0.71) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.84 
(0.83) 
4 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.57 
(0.68) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.06 
(0.93) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-1.89 *** 
(1.11) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
-0.06 
(0.11) 
0.58 * 
(0.15) 
0.57 * 
(0.15) 
0.56 * 
(0.15) 
0.34 ** 
(0.16) 
0.30 *** 
(0.16) 
0.29 * 
(0.16) 
Log  
(Economic Development) 
9.93 * 
(0.15) 
9.91 * 
(0.15) 
9.90 * 
(0.15) 
9.46 * 
(0.23) 
9.45 * 
(0.23) 
9.45 * 
(0.23) 
12.37 * 
(0.26)  
12.27 * 
(0.26) 
12.26 * 
(0.26) 
Democracy  
0.23 * 
(0.04) 
0.23 * 
(0.04) 
0.23 * 
(0.04) 
0.25 * 
(0.06) 
0.25 * 
(0.06) 
0.24 * 
(0.06) 
0.28 * 
(0.06) 
0.28 * 
(0.06) 
0.27 * 
(0.06) 
Right Wing Parties  
in Power 
-3.23 * 
(0.50) 
-3.25 * 
(0.51) 
-3.25 * 
(0.51) 
-2.41 * 
(0.70) 
-2.43 * 
(0.70) 
-2.43 * 
(0.70) 
-0.45 
(0.75) 
-0.49 
(0.76) 
-0.48 
(0.76) 
Leftists Parties in Power 
-1.40 ** 
(0.61) 
-1.31 ** 
(0.61) 
-1.30 ** 
(0.61) 
-1.40 + 
(0.99) 
-1.35 + 
(0.99) 
-1.32  
(0.99) 
-0.002 
(1.33) 
0.39 
(1.33) 
0.13 
(1.32) 
Centrists Parties in Power 
1.33 * 
(0.46) 
1.36 * 
(0.46) 
1.35 * 
(0.46) 
-1.74 * 
(0.65) 
-1.72 * 
(0.65) 
-1.73 * 
(0.65) 
0.72 
(0.76) 
0.77  
(0.76) 
0.74 
(0.76) 
Majority of Ruling 
 Government 
0.78 
(0.64) 
0.74 
(0.66) 
0.71 
(0.65) 
3.85 * 
(0.97) 
3.84 * 
(0.99) 
3.75 * 
(0.99) 
3.86 * 
(1.15) 
4.08 * 
(1.15) 
3.98 * 
(1.14) 
Civil War 
-2.41 * 
(0.42) 
-2.34 * 
(0.42) 
-2.34 * 
(0.42) 
-4.80 * 
(0.57) 
-4.76 * 
(0.57) 
-4.75 * 
(0.57) 
-1.83 * 
(0.79)  
-1.96 * 
(0.68) 
-2.04 * 
(0.68) 
Time Dummy 
0.63 * 
(0.02) 
0.63 * 
(0.02) 
0.63 * 
(0.02) 
0.69 * 
(0.03) 
0.69 * 
(0.03) 
0.69 * 
(0.03) 
0.60 * 
(0.03) 
0.60 * 
(0.04) 
0.59 * 
(0.03) 
 
R-squared  0.800797 0.799011 0.799203  0.686755  0.686590  0.686802  0.732959 0.730917 0.730967 
Adjusted R-squared  0.799969 0.798176 0.798116  0.685401  0.685235  0.685039  0.731537 0.729485 0.729103 
S.E. of regression  8.566407 8.604715 8.605985  11.45990  11.46292 11.46649  12.12392  12.17017  12.17877 
F-statistic  961.9397  952.5289 732.6332  512.2402  511.3074  393.1284  510.3766 506.0523 388.6436   25
Number of Countries  78  78  78 75  75 75  61  61  61 
Total  No. of Observations  2495 2495 2495  2400  2400  2400  1952 1952 1952 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. Models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis; GLO = Globalization 
Index; EGLO = Economic Globalization Index; REST = Restrictions Index; Sample period: 1975 – 2006. 
Instrument Variables = GDP growth rate (t-1); Log (Economic Development (t-1)) & Democracy (t-1) 
 
 
 
 
Annexure 4: Election cycle & Modified Globalization; Modified Economic 
Globalization; Modified Restrictions equation 
 
 
Variables Model  19 
 
(MGLO) 
Model 20 
 
(MGLO) 
Model 21 
 
(MGLO) 
Model 22 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 23 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 24 
 
(ECO GLO) 
Model 25 
 
(MREST) 
Model 26 
 
(MREST) 
Model 27 
 
(MREST) 
 
Constant  -5.88 * 
(0.22) 
-5.86 * 
(0.23) 
-5.92 * 
(0.23) 
-8.97 * 
(0.61) 
-8.97 * 
(0.62) 
-9.06 * 
(0.63) 
8.75 * 
(0.33) 
8.69 * 
(0.34) 
8.79 * 
(0.33) 
Scheduled Election year 
-0.17 * 
(0.06) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.17 *** 
(0.09) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.07  
(0.06) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
Mid-term Election year 
------ 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.03 
(0.03) 
------ 
 
1 year before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.02 
(0.08) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.10 
(0.13) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
2 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.03 
(0.08) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.14 
(0.15) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
3 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.07 
(0.08) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
0.16 
(0.15) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
4 years before Elections 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.02 
(0.13) 
------ 
 
------ 
 
-0.07 
(0.16) 
GDP Growth rate 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
-0.01 ** 
(0.00) 
0.07 * 
(0.01) 
0.07 * 
(0.01) 
0.07 * 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
Log  
(Economic Development) 
0.83 * 
(0.03) 
0.83 * 
(0.03) 
0.83 * 
(0.02) 
1.18 * 
(0.07) 
1.18 * 
(0.07) 
1.18 * 
(0.07) 
-0.80 * 
(0.04) 
-0.80 * 
(0.04) 
-0.80 * 
(0.04) 
Democracy  
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.0002 
(0.00) 
-0.06 * 
(0.01) 
-0.06 * 
(0.01) 
-0.06 * 
(0.01) 
-0.02 * 
(0.01) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 ** 
(0.01) 
Right Wing Parties  
in Power 
-0.29 * 
(0.07) 
-0.29 * 
(0.07) 
-0.29 * 
(0.07) 
-0.78 * 
(0.13) 
-0.78 * 
(0.14) 
-0.79 * 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.08) 
Leftists Parties in Power 
-0.28 * 
(0.07) 
-0.27 * 
(0.07) 
-0.27 * 
(0.07) 
0.28 
(0.28) 
0.29 
(0.28) 
0.29 
(0.29) 
0.12 
(0.12) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
Centrists Parties in Power 
0.05 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
-0.66 * 
(0.12) 
-0.65 * 
(0.12) 
-0.65 * 
(0.12) 
0.18  
(0.11) 
0.18 *** 
(0.10) 
0.18 *** 
(0.10) 
Majority of Ruling 
 Government 
0.25 * 
(0.08) 
0.25 * 
(0.08) 
0.24 * 
(0.08) 
1.08 * 
(0.17) 
1.08 * 
(0.17) 
1.05 * 
(0.16) 
0.05  
(0.15) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.15) 
Civil War 
-0.21 * 
(0.04) 
-0.20 * 
(0.04) 
-0.20 * 
(0.04) 
-0.40 * 
(0.07) 
-0.39 * 
(0.07) 
-0.39 * 
(0.07) 
-0.01 * 
(0.10) 
-0.02  
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
Time Dummy  0.06 *  0.06 *  0.05 *  0.08 *  0.08 *  0.09 *  -0.04 *  -0.04 *  -0.04 *   26
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
R-squared  0.504822 0.503232 0.503357  0.360837  0.360108  0.360673  0.449472 0.449476 0.449262 
Adjusted R-squared  0.502829 0.501232 0.500755  0.358161  0.357429  0.357188  0.446634 0.446639 0.445566 
S.E. of regression  1.351374 1.353543 1.354191  2.338813  2.340146  2.340584  1.481426 1.481420 1.482855 
F-statistic    251.6325      134.3882   158.3891    121.5463 
Number of Countries  78  78  78 75  75 75  61  61  61 
Total  No. of Observations  2495 2495 2495  2400  2400  2400  1952 1952 1952 
Note: * Significant at 1% confidence level; ** Significant at 5% confidence level *** Significant at 10% 
confidence level; + Significant at 15% confidence level. Models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis; GLO = Globalization 
Index; EGLO = Economic Globalization Index; REST = Restrictions Index; Sample period: 1975 – 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
Annexure 5: 78 countries under Study 
 
Argentina Norway  Nepal 
Australia Mauritius  new  Zealand 
Austria Malawi Pakistan 
Belgium Malaysia  panama 
Bangladesh Netherlands Peru 
Bolivia Gabon  Philippines 
Brazil UK Poland 
Botswana Greece  Portugal 
Canada Guatemala  Paraguay 
Switzerland Guyana  Romania 
Chile Honduras  Senegal 
Cote de Ivory  Haiti  Singapore 
Cameroon Hungary El  Salvador 
Colombia Indonesia  Sweden 
Costa Rice  India  Syria 
Cyprus Ireland Thailand 
Germany  Iran  Trinidad & Tobago 
Denmark Israel  Tunisia 
Dominican republic  Italy  Tanzania 
Algeria Jamaica  turkey 
Ecuador Japan Uruguay 
Egypt Kenya  USA 
Spain Sri  Lanka  Venezuela 
Finland Madagascar south  Africa 
Fiji Mexico  Zambia 
France Mali  Zimbabwe 
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Graph 2 
 
Coefficients on Election Cycle of Economic Globalization Index
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Graph 3 
 
Coefficients on Election Cycle of Restrictions Index
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